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UTILITARIANISM AND
PRIORITARIANISM I
DAVID MCCARTHY
University of Edinburgh
Utilitarianism and prioritarianism make a strong assumption about
measures of how good lotteries over histories are for individuals, or for
short, individual goodness measures. Given some idealizing assumptions
about interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons, they presuppose that
any individual goodness measure can be transformed into any other
individual goodness measure by a positive afﬁne transformation. But it is
far from obvious that the presupposition is correct, so both theories face
the threat of presupposition failure. The usual response to this problem
starts by assuming that what implicitly determines the set of individual
goodness measures is independent of our discourse about utilitarianism
and prioritarianism. I suggest reversing this response. What determines
the set of individual goodness measures just is the body of platitudes we
accept about utilitarianism and prioritarianism. This approach vindicates
the utilitarian and prioritarian presupposition. As a corollary, it shows that
individual goodness measures are expectational, and provides an answer
to an argument due to Broome that for different reasons to do with
measurement, prioritarianism is more or less meaningless.
The textbooks say that utilitarianism tells us to maximize the sum of
individual goodness. But a problem lurks. For the deﬁnition turns out to
presuppose that there is amore or less unique arithmeticalmeasure of how
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good histories, or lotteries over histories, are for individuals. But it looks
very much as if there is no such measure. And if not, utilitarianism suffers
from presupposition failure, and turns out to be more or less meaningless.
And so do its main competitors, like prioritarianism.
By reformulating a famous theorem of Harsanyi (1955), Broome (1991)
claims to have solved the problem for utilitarianism. We do indeed have
a more or less unique arithmetical measure of individual goodness. But
a surprising byproduct of his argument is his claim that for somewhat
different reasons, prioritarianism is still more or less meaningless.
Prioritarianism, Broome tells us, distinguishes between individual
goodness and how much individual goodness contributes towards overall
goodness. But Broome claims that this is a meaningless distinction. For
helpful elaboration on Broome’s argument, see Jensen (1995).
Broome (2004) withdraws a major component of the solution to the
problem for utilitarianism. Since the argument against prioritarianism in
Broome (1991) was a corollary to that solution, it is not so clear how
much trouble for prioritarianism remains. However, there is no doubt that
Broome has identiﬁed an important issue. For even if we set aside the
threat of presupposition failure, it is hard to believe that we understand
utilitarianism or prioritarianism well if we do not understand arithmetical
measures of individual goodness.
I am not going to say much more about Broome’s approach to the
problem for utilitarianism. It is complex, and I have offered my criticisms
of it in McCarthy (forthcoming). Here I try to be more constructive
and develop a different approach. Not only does this approach solve
the problem for utilitarianism, but it simultaneously solves the problem
Broome (1991) thinks prioritarianism is faced with. Moreover, these
solutions turn out to be mutually reinforcing.
Section 1 outlines a framework for expressing interpersonal and
intrapersonal comparisons. Section 2 explains why utilitarianism and
prioritarianism appear to suffer from presupposition failure. Section 3
suggests a natural response to the threat of presupposition failure.
Sections 4 through 7 develop this response, and argue that in the end
utilitarianism and prioritarianism do not suffer from presupposition
failure. To this point I will have ignored Broome’s (1991) criticisms of
prioritarianism. But section 8 shows how the response to the threat of
presupposition failure provides a reply, and also addresses Sen’s (1976,
1977, 1986) inﬂuential views about the relationship between utilitarianism
and Harsanyi’s theorem.
1. INTERPERSONAL AND INTRAPERSONAL COMPARISONS
The problem utilitarians and prioritarians face will be easier to discuss
if we have a framework for expressing interpersonal and intrapersonal
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comparisons, and in this section I outline a fairly standard approach. This
article is only concerned with what utilitarianism and prioritarianism say
about constant populations, so the population of individuals is assumed
to be ﬁxed throughout.
We are going to be concerned throughout with lotteries over
entire world histories. The usual way of expressing interpersonal and
intrapersonal comparisons is to say such things as: a lottery L1 is better for
an individual i than L2 is for j. When i and j are different individuals,
that expresses an interpersonal comparison. When they are the same
individual, it expresses an intrapersonal comparison. But it turns out to be
much easier to group the individual and lottery into a pair. Thus the better
life lottery relation holds between (i, L1) and (j, L2) just in case L1 is at least
as good for i as L2 is for j.
It is often thought that there exist values which are very different, and
that as a result, there can be two lives such that it is not the case that one
life is better than the other, and not the case that the two lives are equally
good. But while making room for this possibility does nothing to solve the
problems about utilitarianism and prioritarianism this article is concerned
with, it does make them harder to discuss. So I am going to idealize this
problem away. More precisely, I will assume that the better life lottery
relation is complete: for any individuals i and j and any lotteries L1 and L2,
either L1 is at least as good for i as L2 is for j, or L2 is at least as good for j
as L1 is for i.
Completeness is one of the axioms of expected utility theory. It will
be easier to say what the rest of those axioms are in a different context.
But once we accept the assumption that the better life lottery relation is
complete, it is very plausible that the better life lottery relation satisﬁes all
of the axioms of expected utility theory (Hammond 1991; Broome 2004).
To say what the formal upshot of this is, we need a concept which will
recur throughout the article.
A real valued function v represents a binary relation R just in case: for all x
and y: Rxy if and only if v (x) ≥ v (y)
A function which represents a relation is really nothing more than a
mathematical description of that relation. But even though it is the relation
we are normally interested in, it is often easier to work with a function
which represents it rather than work directly with the relation itself.
The formal signiﬁcance of the claim that the better life lottery relation
satisﬁes the axioms of expected utility theory is this. There exists a function
u (i, L) with the following two properties. First, it represents the better life
lottery relation. In other words,
For all individuals i and j, and all lotteries L1 and L2: L1 is at least as good for
i as L2 is for j if and only if u (i, L1) ≥ u (i, L2).
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Second, for any individual i, and any lottery of the form L = [p1, h1; p2,
h2; . . . ; pm, hm] where every possible history hj under L has a corresponding
positive probability pj and all the probabilities sum to one,
u(i, L) = p1u(i, h1) + p2u(i, h2) + · · · + pmu(i, hm)
This last condition means that u (i, L1) is what is known as an expectational
function, because the value it gives to L from i’s point of view is equal to
the value it gives to h1 from i’s point of view, the value it gives to h2 from i’s
point of view and so on, each multiplied by its corresponding probability
then all added up. From now on, u (i, L) will always be this function.
An assumption which I might as well state here will simplify the
discussion to enable us to focus more sharply on the philosophical
problems. Anyone not interested in technicalities can ignore it. Very
roughly, Iwill assume some lives are better than others, that any individual
can lead any possible kind of life, and that all combinations of possible
kinds of lives are possible. In technical terms, let I be the image of u (i, L).
Then I am assuming that I is an interval of real numbers of positive length,
and that for any member [x1, x2, . . . ,xn] of the Cartesian product In, there
exists a lottery L such that for every member of the population i = 1 . . . n,
u (i, L) = xi. This assumption is very similar to what Broome (1991) calls the
rectangular ﬁeld assumption, and it is not misleading to use the same name
for it. Broome outlines the philosophical questions it raises, but like him,
I am simply going to take it for granted. It guarantees that the domain of
the betterness relation is simple enough for us to be able to exploit some
powerful theorems.
2. THE THREAT OF PRESUPPOSITION FAILURE
In this section I begin by identifying a presupposition utilitarianism and
prioritarianism share. The natural way to do this is to derive it from the
way they are standardly formulated. But this forces an immediate choice
upon us.
We are going to be concernedwith utilitarian andprioritarian accounts
of the betterness relation. The betterness relation holds between two lotteries
L1 and L2 just in case L1 is at least as good as L2. But there are two
sorts of things to take into account in thinking about a lottery over his-
tories: people and uncertainty.
One approachdealswithpeopleﬁrst. Very roughly, it starts by trying to
combine the points of view of all the different people to assess what each
possible history is like. That provides some sort of evaluation of what
each history is like as a whole. Then it deals with uncertainty. Given the
evaluation ofwhat each history is like, it then takes into account how likely
each different history is to form an on balance evaluation of the lottery as
a whole. Economists often call this an ex post approach to aggregation.
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The other approach deals with uncertainty ﬁrst. Very roughly, it starts
by trying to combine all the different histories from the point of view of
each person, taking into account how likely each different history is. That
provides some sort of evaluation of the lottery as a whole from the point
of view of each different person. Then it deals with people. Given the
evaluations of the lottery from the point of view of each person, it then
forms an on balance evaluation of the lottery as a whole. Economists often
call this an ex ante approach to aggregation.
Ex ante and ex post approaches to aggregation are not in general
equivalent. Given some sort of distributive idea, such as giving priority to
the worse off, we could apply it to people ﬁrst, then deal with uncertainty,
as the ex post approach recommends. Or we could deal with uncertainty
ﬁrst, and then apply it to people, as the ex ante approach recommends. It
turns that for almost all distributive ideas, it matters what the order is. Ex
ante applications lead to answers which conﬂict with ex post applications
(Hammond 1981).
I will say more about this in section 7. I point out the conﬂict now only
to be upfront about how one’s initial formulation of a distributive view in
the context of uncertainty is almost bound to take sides. With the beneﬁt
of hindsight it turns out to be easier to deal with ex ante views ﬁrst. So
in their spirit, I am going to start off by assuming that there is a unique
measure g (i, L) of how good lotteries are for individuals or, as I will say,
an individual goodness measure. The function g takes an individual and a
lottery and gives a real number which is supposed to be a measure of how
good the lottery is for the individual. We are going to be much concerned
withwhat conditions a function has to satisfy to be an individual goodness
measure, but for now one thing is obvious. To be an individual goodness
measure, a function has to represent the better life lottery relation.
We can now deﬁne ex ante utilitarianism. Throughout the population
of individuals i = 1 . . . n is assumed to be constant and to contain at least
two people, and
∑
i expresses summation over those individuals.
Ex ante utilitarianism For all lotteries L1 and L2, L1 is at least as good as L2
if and only if
∑
ig(i, L1) ≥
∑
ig(i, L2)
To deﬁne ex ante prioritarianism we need some terminology. A function
f is increasing just in case for all x and y in its domain, x > y ⇒ f (x) >
f (y). And f is strictly concave just in case for all distinct x and y in its
domain, f
( x + y
2
)
> 12 ( f (x)+ f (y)). For example, the function
√
x on the
non-negative reals is both increasing (it gets larger as x gets larger) and
strictly concave (because it gets ﬂatter as x gets larger). The following
deﬁnition is standard.
Ex ante prioritarianism There is an increasing and strictly concave function
w such that for all lotteries L1 and L2, L1 is at least as good as L2 if and only
if
∑
iw(g(i, L1)) ≥
∑
iw(g (i, L2))
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Parﬁt (1991) says that the priority view departs from utilitarianism in
exactly one way: it claims that beneﬁting the worse off matters more. To
show how the deﬁnition of ex ante prioritarianism captures this idea, it
will help ﬁrst to formalize the idea. A Pigou-Dalton transfer of individual
goodness is a transfer which leaves all but two people unaffected, makes
the better off of those twopeopleAworse off by some amount of individual
goodness and makes the worse off of those two people B better off by the
same amount of individual goodness while still leaving A better off than B
originally was. So Pigou-Dalton transfers of individual goodness preserve
the total sum of individual goodness, but make two individuals closer to
being equally well off than they were to start with.
We can now express Parﬁt’s idea as follows: Pigou-Dalton transfers
of individual goodness are always improvements. Or, if a lottery L1 can
be obtained from a lottery L2 by a Pigou-Dalton transfer of individual
goodness, then L1 is better than L2. It is obvious that ex ante utilitarianism
is always indifferent to Pigou-Dalton transfers of individual goodness.
The only difference between the formulae in the deﬁnitions of the ex ante
versions of utilitarianism and prioritarianism is the presence of w in the
deﬁnition of prioritarianism. But it easily follows from the deﬁnition of an
increasing and strictly concave function that ex ante prioritarianism always
regards Pigou-Dalton transfers of individual goodness as improvements.
So the deﬁnition of ex ante prioritarianism captures Parﬁt’s idea.
It is easy to see that the above formulations of utilitarianism and
prioritarianism are ex ante views. For according to the formula in each
formulation, the ﬁrst thing that happens in the assessment of a lottery L is
that it is converted into a number g (i, L) for each individual i that measures
how good the lottery is for i. But to save words, I will drop ‘ex ante’ until
section 7.
The next question is about how to deﬁne utilitarianism and priori-
tarianism if there exists more than one individual goodness measure. But
before addressing this I need to say what it means to say that there is
more than one individual goodness measure. In one way, the answer is
obvious: there simply happen to be two or more functions which satisfy
the predicate ‘is an individual goodness measure’. But the real questions
are about how that could happen, and if it does happen, how we are to
interpret sentences which speak as if there is just one individual goodness
measure.
That it is not uncommon for there to be two or more measures of the
same thing is clear. We can measure height in inches or in centimeters,
for example. It is arbitrary which of these measures of height we choose
to use. And that suggests how there can be more than one measure: each
of the measures makes what is in some sense an arbitrary choice. In the
case of the height measures, the arbitrariness lies in the choice of unit.
And that suggests an answer to the question about interpretation. Given a
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 27 Nov 2012
UTILITARIANISM AND PRIORITARIANISM I 341
sentence which speaks as if there is just one measure when in fact there is
more than one, to determine its truth value we have to ignore the arbitrary
elements in the measures. One standard approach is to superevaluate (van
Fraassen 1966). To determine the truth value of a sentence like ‘The height
of this building is twice the height of that building’ we ﬁrst have to work
out the truth value of the sentence relative to each measure in the entire
class of height measures. According to the method of superevaluation, if
the sentence is true relative to each, then it is true. If the sentence is false
relative to each, then it is false. And if it is true relative to some and false
relative to others, then it is neither true nor false. Other approaches might
in this third case say that the truth value of the sentence is indeterminate,
but the differences in detail between these approaches are not important
here.
Standard formulations of utilitarianism and prioritarianism speak as if
there is just one individual goodness measure. Utilitarianism, for example,
is said to tell us to maximize the sum of individual goodness. And I will
assume that we should cater for the possibility that there is more than one
individual goodnessmeasure by superevaluating. But given the idealizing
assumption that the better life lottery relation is complete, I know of no
suggestion in the literature that utilitarianism and prioritarianism could
suffer from truth value gaps. Given superevaluation, the absence of truth
value gaps means that utilitarianism and prioritarianism presuppose that
if g and g˜ are distinct individual goodness measures, then the deliverances
of utilitarianism and prioritarianism do not depend on which one of g or
g˜ is used. More precisely, utilitarianism, for example, presupposes
(1) There exists an individual goodness measure g (i, L), and for all
individual goodness measures g˜(i, L) and all lotteries L1 and L2,∑
i g(i, L1) ≥
∑
i g(i, L2) if and only if
∑
i g˜(i, L1) ≥
∑
i g˜(i, L2).
But this condition is quite complicated, and it would be easier to
understand what utilitarianism presupposes if we could ﬁnd a simpler
statement about individual goodness measures which is logically
equivalent to it.
As it happens, there is one. But the rigorous statement and full proof
of this result is unfortunately quite long and technical. But it is important
and the theorem it exploits will be used several times in what follows, so
I will give a brief sketch.
I begin with a simplifying assumption. I assumed that the better life
lottery relation satisﬁes the axioms of expected utility theory. In part that
means I assumed that it is what is known as a continuous relation, and I
am now going to assume that the betterness relation is continuous.
To explain, for any two lotteries over histories L and M and any α such
that 0 < α < 1 we can deﬁne the compound lottery αL + (1 − α)M as the
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lottery which scales down L’s probabilities by α and M’s by 1 − α and then
combines them. For example, if L gave an history h a probability p and
M gave h a probability q, then the probability of h under the compound
lottery is αp + (1 − α)q. Then the betterness relation is continuous just in
case for any lotteries L, M, and N, if L is better than M, and M is better than
N, then there exist α and β, each strictly between 0 and 1 such that αL +
(1 − α)N is better than M, and M is better than βL + (1 − β)N.
Assuming that the betterness relation is continuous greatly simpliﬁes
the mathematics. But it is a mathematical idea which is not easy to
explain informally. But, very roughly, to say that the betterness relation
is continuous means that no history is inﬁnitely better or merely
inﬁnitesimally better than any other. This assumption might not be very
plausible if one was dealing with inﬁnitely long lives, for example. An
eternity in heaven might be inﬁnitely better than one day in heaven. But
if we set such scenarios aside, assuming that the betterness relation is
continuous is reasonable and enables us to exploit an important theorem.
Suppose that g and g˜ are individual goodness measures. Then (1)
entails that
∑
i g(i, L) and
∑
i g˜(i, L) both represent the same relation. But
notice that each of these has an additive form. For example,
∑
i g(i, L) is
just g (1, L)+ g (2, L)+ . . .+ g (n, L). For this reason,∑ i g(i, L) and
∑
i g˜(i, L)
are what are known as additive representations.
But there is a very important theorem which says, roughly,
that additive representations are essentially unique. If there are two
additive representations of the same relation, then each of the additive
representations can be obtained from the other by what is known
as a positive afﬁne transformation. A positive afﬁne transformation is a
transformation of the form x → ax + b where a > 0 and b are real numbers.
Broome (1991) provides an informal discussion.
I have left out some technicalities. But it turns out that with all the
assumptions that have been made so far, we have all the bits and pieces
needed to exploit this theorem rigorously. And the theorem shows that
with our assumptions, (1) entails that
(2) There exists an individual goodness measure g (i, L), and all individual
goodness measures are positive afﬁne transformations of g (i, L).
In other words, the second clause tells us that if g˜ is an individual
goodness measure, then there exist real numbers a > 0 and b such that
for all individuals i and lotteries L, g˜(i, L) = ag(i, L) + b. Note that if
two individual goodness measures are positive afﬁne transformations of
g (i, L), then they are also positive afﬁne transformations of each other.
On the other hand, it is easy to show that (2) entails (1). For suppose
g˜(i, L) is an individual goodness measure. By (2), there exist a > 0 and
b such that g˜(i, L) = ag(i, L) + b. With n the size of the population, we
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have:
∑
i g(i, L1)≥
∑
i g(i, L2)⇔ nb + a
∑
i g(i, L1)≥ nb + a
∑
i g(i, L2) ⇔∑
i (ag(i, L1) + b) ≥
∑
i (ag(i, L2) + b) ⇔
∑
i g˜(i, L1) ≥
∑
i g˜(i, L2).
We have therefore shown that utilitarianism presupposes (1), and
that with modest assumptions (1) is logically equivalent to (2). Hence
utilitarianism presupposes (2).
But how about prioritarianism? Prioritarianism is more complicated
because whereas utilitarianism claims that a particular candidate
betterness relation is correct, prioritarianism claims that somemember of a
whole class of candidate betterness relations is correct. Roughly speaking,
different prioritarian betterness relations agree that beneﬁting the worse
off matters more, but disagree among themselves about how much more.
But there is no suggestion in the literature that it can be neither true
nor false that a particular relation is a prioritarian betterness relation. So I
take prioritarianism to presuppose that there exists at least one individual
goodness measure, and that for every candidate betterness relation R,
either R is a prioritarian betterness relation according to every individual
goodness measure, or it is a prioritarian betterness relation according to no
individual goodnessmeasure.Moreprecisely, prioritarianismpresupposes
(1∗) There exists an individual goodness measure, and for every candidate
betterness relation R, it is either the case that for every individual
goodnessmeasure g (i, L) there exists an increasing and strictly concave
function w such that R is represented by
∑
iw(g (i, L)), or it is the case
that for no individual goodness measure g (i, L) does there exist an
increasing and strictly concave function w such that R is represented
by
∑
iw(g (i, L)).
We have already assumed that the betterness relation is continuous.
But with this assumption to hand, one can show that (1∗) is logically
equivalent to (2). Hence prioritarianism makes the same presupposition
about individual goodness measures as utilitarianism. This is a pleasant
result, for it vindicates what one would naively expect, namely that
utilitarianism and prioritarianism agree about how individual goodness
is to be measured, and only disagree about how it should be distributed.
Putting everything together, we have
The utilitarian and prioritarian presupposition There exists an individual
goodness measure g (i, L), and all individual goodness measures are positive
afﬁne transformations of g (i, L).
Notice that this does not say that all positive afﬁne transformations of
g (i, L) are individual goodness measures. It only says that the individual
goodness measures are a subset of, or lie among, the positive afﬁne
transformations of g (i, L), i.e. functions of the form ag(i, L) + b where
a > 0. The utilitarian and prioritarian presupposition would be true
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if the individual goodness measures were precisely the positive afﬁne
transformations of g (i, L), in which case g (i, L) is said to be unique up to
positive afﬁne transformation. But it would also be true if the individual
goodness measures were precisely the positive linear transformations of
g (i, L), i.e. functions of the form ag(i, L) where a > 0. And it would be true
if g (i, L) was the only individual goodness measure.
We can now state the problem utilitarianism and prioritarianism face.
We have already noted that a necessary condition for a function to be
an individual goodness measure is that it has to represent the better life
lottery relation. But it is far from obvious that this is not also a sufﬁcient
condition. In other words, it is far from obvious that there are any other
constraints a function has to satisfy to be an individual goodness measure
beyond representing the better life lottery relation.
In one way, this is good news. Part of the utilitarian and prioritarian
presupposition is that there exists an individual goodness measure. And
the assumption that the better life lottery relation satisﬁes the axioms of
expected utility theory vindicates this presupposition. For it tells us that
there is at least one functionwhich represents the better life lottery relation.
We met it in the last section, the function u (i, L).
But in another way, it is bad news. Suppose there exists an individual
goodness measure g (i, L). The other part of the utilitarian and prioritarian
presupposition says that all of the individual goodness measures have
to be positive afﬁne transformations of g (i, L). The trouble comes from
the following well-known result, easily proved from the deﬁnitions of an
increasing function and of representation.
Lemma 1: Suppose a function v represents a binary relation R. Then a
function v˜ also representsR if and only if there exists an increasing function
f such that v˜(x) = f (v(x)).
In other words, if you apply an increasing transformation to a function
which represents a relation, the result is another function which represents
that relation. And if any two functions represent the same relation, each
of the functions can be turned into the other by applying some increasing
transformation. Thus as a representation of a relation, a function can only
ever be, in the jargon, unique up to increasing transformation.
But here’s the problem. If all a function has to do to be an individual
goodness measure is to represent the better life lottery relation, then all of
the increasing transformations of g (i, L) are individual goodnessmeasures.
But the class of increasing transformations of g (i, L) is vastly larger than the
class of positive afﬁne transformations of g (i, L). So if all there is to being an
individual goodnessmeasure is representing the better life lottery relation,
there are vastly toomany suchmeasures for the utilitarian and prioritarian
presupposition to be true. Utilitarianism and prioritarianism therefore face
the threat of presupposition failure.
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3. INTERPRETATIVE STRATEGIES
One response to the threat of presupposition failure concedes immediately
that utilitarianism and prioritarianism do indeed rest on a false pre-
supposition. But this a position of last resort because it leads to an error
theory about a large body of discourse. A vast amount of ethical theory
takes utilitarianism seriously, if not by arguing for it, then by reacting
against it. For example, prioritarianism is typically motivated by the claim
that utilitarianism is distributively insensitive and ignores the separateness
of persons, more permissive views by the claim that utilitarianism is too
demanding, more pluralistic views by the claim that utilitarianism is only
true in restricted contexts, and so on. But if utilitarianism suffers from
presupposition failure, it is more or less meaningless. And the result is an
error theory about all this ethical theory.
But standard accounts of charity of interpretation say there is a
standing presumption against such error theories (see e.g. Lewis 1974
and Davidson 1984). In other words, there is a standing presumption
to interpret utilitarianism in a way that vindicates the pivotal role it
plays in ethical theory. So there is a standing presumption to interpret
utilitarianism in a way which vindicates what I will call the platitude
about ethical signiﬁcance: utilitarianism expresses important, substantive,
controversial but reasonably well motivated ethical ideas. And given the
role prioritarianism has played in recent ethical theory, I will take the
platitude about ethical signiﬁcance to apply to prioritarianism as well.
So because of the strong pressure to vindicate the platitude about ethical
signiﬁcance, there is also strong pressure to vindicate the utilitarian and
prioritarian presupposition.
Butwhat kinds of facts could constrain the interpretationof ‘individual
goodness measure’ tightly enough to vindicate the presupposition? It
is obvious that we do not have anything like a widely held, explicit
deﬁnition of the term. The only hope is that facts about our use of the term
somehow constrain interpretation of the term tightly enough to vindicate
the presupposition, and somehow amount to an implicit deﬁnition.
But how are we to do that? I think it is fairly obvious that ‘individual
goodnessmeasure’ is an ethical term.That is, its dominantusage is found in
our theorizing about ethics. And it mainly features in our theorizing about
utilitarianism. For there are number of platitudes about utilitarianism
and about how it relates to competitors like prioritarianism. And since
‘individual goodness measure’ features in the standard deﬁnition of
utilitarianism, it thereby features in those platitudes, at least implicitly.
In fact, as far as I can see, our discourse about utilitarianism contains just
about all the platitudes in which ‘individual goodness measure’ features.
So it is those platitudes which are going to implicitly deﬁne the term if
anything does.
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But actually, I have something more speciﬁc in mind. I suggest that we
ﬁrst use all the platitudes to make the referent of ‘the utilitarian betterness
relation’ and ‘the prioritarian betterness relations’ explicit, and only then
to make the referent of ‘individual goodness measure’ explicit. The form
of inference this approach deploys will be used several times, so I begin
by rehearsing it.
Suppose that knowing only that v (i, L) represents the better life
lottery relation without yet knowing that v (i, L) is an individual goodness
measure, we nevertheless somehow manage to show that the relation
represented by
∑
iv(i, L) is the utilitarian betterness relation. If the
utilitarian and prioritarian presupposition is vindicated, there is an
individual goodness measure g (i, L) such that
∑
ig(i, L) represents the
utilitarian betterness relation. But then
∑
iv(i, L) and
∑
ig(i, L) both
represent the utilitarian betterness relation. But by the result about the
uniqueness of additive representations already sketched in section 2, it
follows that g (i, L) is a positive afﬁne transformation of v (i, L). But if
the utilitarian and prioritarian presupposition is vindicated, the class of
individual goodness measures is a subset of the set of positive afﬁne
transformations of g (i, L). So the class of individual goodness measures
implicit in the claim that the relation represented by
∑
iv(i, L) is the
utilitarian betterness relation turns out to be a subset of the class of positive
afﬁne transformations of v (i, L). I will call this form of inference an inference
to individual goodness. Iwill discuss in section 8whether the set of individual
goodness measures just is the set of positive afﬁne transformations of v (i,
L), or whether instead it is some proper subset thereof.
It is worth noting two things about this interpretative strategy. In one
way, it runs against a widely accepted view. For following the inﬂuential
work of Sen (1976, 1977, 1986), though it seems to me far from clear that
this is Sen’s own view, it is often held that we somehow have to ﬁgure out
what the set of individual goodness measures is without thinking about
utilitarianism. He says little about Sen’s views, but the best developed
approach along these lines is due to Broome (1991). But in McCarthy
(forthcoming) I argue that Broome’s approach does not succeed, and that
the reason for this is just the ignoring of utilitarianism. So here I am
suggesting we reverse the usual strategy. In another way, it accords with
a widely accepted view. For especially following the inﬂuential work of
Lewis (1970), it is often thought that the way to ﬁgure out the referent
of theoretical terms is just to ask what interpretation of those terms best
vindicates the body of platitudes in which they feature.
4. THE CANDIDATES
The goal of this section is to show that we can go quite a long way towards
understanding and narrowing down the relations which are eligible to
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be interpreted as the utilitarian or prioritarian betterness relations just by
exploiting the platitude that individual goodness measures represent the
better life lottery relation.
If the utilitarian and prioritarian presupposition is correct, there exists
an individual goodness measure g (i, L). Utilitarianism then entails that
the betterness relation is represented by
∑
ig(i, L). And prioritarianism
entails that the betterness relation is represented by
∑
iw(g (i, L)) for some
increasing and strictly concave w. Since g (i, L) is an individual goodness
measure, it represents the better life lottery relation. But so does u (i, L).
Therefore, by Lemma1 it follows that g (i, L) is an increasing transformation
of u (i, L). And since w is increasing and g (i, L) represents the better life
lottery relation, it follows by Lemma 1 again that w(g (i, L)) represents
the better life lottery relation. And by another application of Lemma 1,
it follows that w(g (i, L)) is also an increasing transformation of u (i, L).
Therefore, both utilitarianism andprioritarianism entail that the betterness
relation can be represented by
∑
i f (u (i, L)) for some increasing function f.
But we have already assumed that the betterness relation is
continuous. It turns out that this forces the function f in the previous
paragraph to be continuous. Therefore, utilitarianism and prioritarianism
entail that the betterness relation can be represented by
∑
i
f (u(i, L)) for some increasing and continuous function f
I will call the class of relations represented by a function of that form the
candidates. Knowing only that individual goodness measures represent the
better life lottery relation, we have just shown that if the utilitarian and
prioritarian presupposition is correct, then the utilitarian and prioritarian
betterness relations have to lie among the candidates.
The rest of the section investigates the candidates more closely. So it
will be looking at what the utilitarian and prioritarian betterness relations
have in common. We will be using representation theorems to do this, so
ﬁrst I have to introduce the principles and concepts which go into these
theorems. Their deﬁnitions are tacitly restricted to the case in which the
population is constant, which we are assuming throughout. The following
is due to Broome (1991).
Principle of personal good If two lotteries are equally good for each person,
then they are equally good. And if one lottery is better for one person than
another lottery, and at least as good for every person, then the ﬁrst lottery is
better than the second.
The betterness relation is an ordering just in case it is transitive and complete.
It is transitive just in case for all lotteries L1, L2, and L3: if L1 is at least as
good as L2 and L2 is at least as good as L3, then L1 is at least as good as
L3. It is complete just in case for any two lotteries L1 and L2: either L1 is at
least as good as L2, or L2 is at least as good as L1.
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The betterness relation is impartial just in case, roughly, it is indifferent
to which individuals are leading particular sorts of lives. More precisely,
call a permutation a mapping of the individuals 1 . . . n onto themselves, so
that distinct individuals are mapped onto distinct individuals. Suppose
that for two lotteries L1 and L2 there exists a permutation π of the
individuals such that for all individuals i, L1 is exactly as good for i as
L2 is for π (i). Then the betterness relation is impartial just in case in all
such cases, L1 and L2 are equally good.
The betterness relation is strongly separable across people just in case
whenever two lotteries L1 and L2 are equally good for each member of
a group of people, what the lotteries are actually like for those people is
irrelevant to the question of whether L1 is at least as good as L2.1
All of these principles and concepts can of course be stated fully
rigorously. But it is very important to note that they only use information
supplied by the better life lottery relation.
This is the representation theorem.
Theorem 2: Assume a constant population of individuals i = 1 . . . n where
n ≥ 2. Assume that the better life lottery relation satisﬁes the axioms of
expected utility theory, so that there exists an expectational function u (i, L)
which represents it. And also assume that the rectangular ﬁeld assumption
is true. Then the betterness relation is represented by
∑
i f (u (i, L)) for
some increasing and continuous function f if and only if the principle of
personal good is true and the betterness relation is an impartial continuous
ordering which is strongly separable across people (and if n = 2 satisﬁes
the hexagon condition).
Theorem 2 can be proved from a well-known theorem about additive
representation. It is called the central theorem of additive representation
in Wakker (1989), which provides a rigorous introduction to the theorem.
A rigorous survey of results which are similar to Theorem 2 and their
application to utilitarianism is in Blackorby, Bossert andDonaldson (2002).
Theorem 2 is related to their discussion of what they call generalized
utilitarianism.
1 It turns out that for the assumption that the betterness relation is strongly separable across
people to have full effect, the population has to contain at least three people. But when
there are exactly two people, the full effect can be obtained by assuming that the betterness
relation satisﬁes what is known as the hexagon condition. See e.g. Wakker (1989) for a
deﬁnition and discussion of this condition, which is too complicated to state here. If there
is a case for the assumption that the betterness relation is strongly separable across people
when there are at least three people, I believe there is an equally good case for the claim that
it satisﬁes the hexagon condition when there are exactly two people. But I cannot discuss
this here, and will usually suppress the condition. Anyone who wants to entirely ignore it
can assume that the population always contains at least three people.
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Call the background assumptions the assumptions that the better life
lottery relation satisﬁes the axioms of expected utility theory, and that the
rectangular ﬁeld assumption is true. With the background assumptions
in place, Theorem 2 tells us that the claim that the betterness relation
lies among the candidates is equivalent to the claim that the principle
of personal good is true and that the betterness relation is an impartial
continuous ordering which is strongly separable across people.
But both the principle of personal good and the claim that the
betterness relation is an impartial continuous ordering which is strongly
separable across people are reasonably well motivated substantive ethical
ideas (or in the case of continuity, a mild idealizing assumption). The only
real exception is the implicit claim that the betterness relation is complete,
which it has to be to be an ordering. If the better life lottery relation is
incomplete, the betterness relation will also be incomplete. But this is the
only reason I have seen put forward in the literature for doubting that the
betterness relation is complete. This needs more discussion, but here I am
going to treat the completeness of the betterness relation as an idealizing
assumption which is on a par with the idealizing assumption that the
better life lottery relation is complete.
This is not to say that all of the ideas are uncontroversial. For example,
although the claim that the betterness relation is strongly separable across
people is reasonably plausible, it is the hallmark of egalitarianism to deny
it. In fact, the claim that the betterness relation is strongly separable across
people seems to be the best way of formalizing the informal idea of non-
relationality which Parﬁt (1991) uses to distinguish the priority view from
egalitarianism; see Jensen (2003) for further discussion. But the discussion
is enough to show that the claim that the betterness relation lies among the
candidates expresses substantive, reasonably well motivated ethical ideas.
This result will be important when we return to the platitude about ethical
signiﬁcance.
5. LOTTERIES
The previous section looked at what the utilitarian and prioritarian
betterness relations agree about. But to sort out what those relations
actually are, we have to consider what they disagree about. The next
section argues that we ought to interpret their differences in terms of
what they say about the distribution of chances. We already know that
the utilitarian and prioritarian betterness relations have to lie among the
candidates. So this section does some preliminarywork by looking at what
different candidates say about the distribution of chances.
Consider the following two lotteries. In essence, they were ﬁrst
discussed by Diamond (1967) as a criticism of Harsanyi (1955).
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L= 12
1
2
A 1 0
B 0 1
LA 12
1
2
A 1 1
B 0 0
The numbers are meant to do nothing more than encode information
supplied by the better life lottery relation in the obvious way. For example,
a history in which A gets 1 is exactly as good for A as a history in which
B gets 1 is for B. The lottery L= gives A and B equal chances of better and
worse histories. But LA gives A the better history for certain, and B the
worse history for certain. The lotteries are equally good for everyone else.
The pair of L= and LA is really a schema, and could havemanydifferent
instances. It could involve allocating a lifesaving resource to one of two
patients, or a sweet to one of two children. I will say that, for example, L=
is always better than LA to mean that for any instance of the pair L= and
LA, the instance of L= is better than the instance of LA. Then the betterness
relation satisﬁes the lottery claim just in case it says that L= is always better
than LA. And it satisﬁes lottery-neutrality just in case it says that L= and LA
are always equally good. These concepts can easily be formalized using
only information supplied by the better life lottery relation.
The claim that the betterness relation satisﬁes the lottery claim has
often been defended. The usual argument for it starts with the intuitive
appeal of giving each person equal chances. And it is typically backed up
by appeals to the separateness of persons. For example, Broome (1990–91)
says that giving each person equal chances is better because it is fairer. And
fairness is an issue that arises only when the claims of different people are
being balanced. But the most extensive defense is in Kamm (1993) who
appeals directly to the separateness of persons and the signiﬁcance of the
personal point of view.
The claim that the betterness relation satisﬁes lottery-neutrality has
often been defended as well. The main argument for it is an argument
for the claim that the betterness relation satisﬁes what is known as strong
independence, the central axiom of expected utility theory. It satisﬁes strong
independence just in case for any lotteries L, M, and N and any α such that
0 < α < 1, L is at least as good as M if and only if the compound lottery
αL + (1 − α)N is at least as good as the compound lottery αM + (1 − α)N.
To illustrate, consider the compound lotteries αL + (1 − α)N and
αM + (1 − α)N where 0 < α < 1. And suppose that these compound
lotteries are run by ﬁrst tossing a biased coin, with probability α of heads,
and probability (1 − α) of tails. If heads comes up, either the lottery L or the
lottery M is run, depending on which of the compound lotteries is chosen;
if tails comes up, either the lottery N or the lottery N is run, depending on
which of the compound lotteries is chosen. But those two lotteries are the
same, sowhat the compound lotteries are like if tails comesup cannotmake
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a difference to their relative evaluation. That only leaves heads, which we
have to take into account since it has a positive probability. But given that
heads comes up, the choice between the two compound lotteries is exactly
the same as choice between the two simple lotteries L and M. Therefore, L
is at least as good as M if and only if αL + (1 − α)N is at least as good as αM
+ (1 − α)N. Hence the betterness relation satisﬁes strong independence.
Or, at least, that is the good prima facie case for the claim that it does. It is
essentially an argument originally set out by Samuelson (1952). For further
discussion in the framework of subjective expected utility theory, see the
discussion of the sure thing principle in Broome (1991).
But one can show that if the betterness relation is transitive and
impartial, then the claim that the betterness relation satisﬁes strong
independence entails that the betterness relation satisﬁes lottery-neutrality.
Taking the claim that the betterness relation is transitive and impartial on
trust, the argument for the claim that it satisﬁes lottery-neutrality is then
just the Samuelson-style argument for strong independence.
I amnot going tomake any attempt to evaluate the relative plausibility
of the claim that the betterness relation satisﬁes the lottery claim and
the claim that it satisﬁes lottery-neutrality. Nor do I have the space to
discuss Broome’s (1991) attempt to reconcile them by claiming, in his
terminology, that unfairness is an individual harm. I believe that this
attempted reconciliation does not succeed, but this will have to serve as
a promissory note. It is enough for the purposes of this article that both
claims arewell established in the literature, and reasonablywellmotivated.
But we are interested in the candidates, and the following theorem
teaches uswhat someof themsay about chances. I omit the straightforward
proof.
Theorem 3: Assume a constant population of individuals i = 1 . . . n where
n ≥ 2. And suppose that u (i, L) is an expectational function which
represents the better life lottery relation. Suppose the betterness relation
can be represented by
∑
i f (u (i, L)) for some increasing and continuous
function f. Then
(i) The betterness relation is represented by
∑
iu(i, L) if and only if
the betterness relation satisﬁes lottery-neutrality if and only if the
betterness relation satisﬁes strong independence, and
(ii) The betterness relation is represented by
∑
i w (u(i, L)) for some
increasing and strictly concave function w if and only if the betterness
relation satisﬁes the lottery claim.
Let U denote the relation represented by
∑
iu(i, L)), and the Ws denote
the relations represented by
∑
i w(u (i, L)) for some increasing and strictly
concave function w. Theorem 3 then teaches us that U is the only candidate
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which satisﬁes lottery neutrality, and that the Ws are the only candidates
which satisfy the lottery claim.
6. INTERPRETATION
I am now going to argue that U is the utilitarian betterness relation, and
that the Ws are the prioritarian betterness relations. Whenever I say that a
particular relation says such and such, that will be short for: it says such
and such when interpreted as the betterness relation.
We know that both the utilitarian and the prioritarian betterness
relations have to lie among the candidates. So to make this argument,
we have to argue that interpreting U as the utilitarian betterness relation
and the Ws as the prioritarian betterness relations vindicates the various
platitudes about utilitarianism and prioritarianism both well enough, and
better than any other interpretation from among the candidates.
The ﬁrst platitude we saw was the platitude about ethical signiﬁcance.
By Theorem 3, we learn that
(i) The betterness relation is U if and only if the betterness relation lies
among the candidates and satisﬁes strong independence.
(ii) The betterness relation is one of the Ws if and only if the betterness
relation lies among the candidates and satisﬁes the lottery claim.
But in section 4 we saw that the claim that the betterness relation lies
among the candidates expresses a reasonably well motivated substantive
ethical claim. In section 5 we saw that the claim that it satisﬁes strong
independence expresses a reasonably well-motivated substantive ethical
claim, as does the claim that it satisﬁes the lottery claim. Therefore,
interpreting U as the utilitarian betterness relation and the Ws as the
prioritarian betterness relations vindicates the platitude about ethical
signiﬁcance.
But there are other platitudes about utilitarianism and prioritarianism.
A good stock is found in the famous discussion of utilitarianism in
Rawls (1971). Rawls makes three main claims about utilitarianism: it
is distributively insensitive, it treats interpersonal and intrapersonal
aggregation in the same way, and it ignores the separateness of persons.
These claims have been endorsed by many writers, are very well
established in the literature, and I am going to treat them as platitudes
about utilitarianism. Prioritarianism is routinely motivated as expressing
a formof opposition to the features of utilitarianismRawls emphasized (see
e.g. Parﬁt 1991 and Rabinowicz 2002). So I will treat the platitudes about
utilitarianism as containing contrastive platitudes about prioritarianism.
For example, I will take it to be a platitude that in whatever way
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utilitarianism is distributively insensitive, prioritarianism is not. I will
discuss the three types of platitudes in turn.
Distributive insensitivity . What does it mean to say that utilitarianism is
distributively insensitive? The usual answer is this:
Standard claim about distributive insensitivity Utilitarianism is always
indifferent to Pigou-Dalton transfers of individual goodness. By contrast,
prioritarianism always regards them as improvements.
However, there is a problem. Our goal is to use platitudes about
utilitarianism and prioritarianism to argue that a particular member of the
candidates should be interpreted as the utilitarian betterness relation, and
that a particular subclass should be interpreted as the class of prioritarian
betterness relations. But as an answer to the question of how utilitarianism
is insensitive to distribution, although this answer is not false, it is useless.
To see this, let V be an arbitrary member of the candidates. It is
therefore represented by a function of the form
∑
iv(i, L) where v (i,
L) represents the better life lottery relation. Suppose we interpret V as
the utilitarian betterness relation. Then by an inference to individual
goodness, the individual goodness measures are a subset of the positive
afﬁne transformations of v (i, L). But it then follows that V is indifferent
to Pigou-Dalton transfers of individual goodness. Furthermore, on this
interpretation the prioritarian betterness relations will be the relations
represented by a function of the form
∑
iw(v (i, L)). And it follows
that they all regard Pigou-Dalton transfers of individual goodness as
improvements. So although the choice of V was completely arbitrary,
interpreting it as the utilitarian betterness relation vindicates the standard
claim about distributive sensitivity. The standard claim is therefore useless
for discriminating among the candidates. If we are to appeal to the
platitude about distributive sensitivity to constrain interpretation,we need
an alternate reading of it.
We can get one by thinking about the distribution of chances. Let hA
and hB be two histories which are equally good for each person apart from
A and B, and which from the point of view of A and B are of the form [1 for
A, 0 for B] and [0 for A, 1 for B]. Assuming that the betterness relation is
impartial, hA and hB are equally good. So the choice between two lotteries
over hA and hB can never make a difference to the goodness of the resulting
history. So the only factor which seems relevant to determining how the
betterness relation orders these two lotteries has to do the distribution
of chances. And we have already seen two views about the signiﬁcance of
this factor in the case of ordering L= and LA. One says that it is a matter of
indifference how the chances are distributed. The other says that it is better
to distribute the chances equally rather than unequally, and to improve the
position of the worse off of the only two people affected by the choice.
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The ﬁrst of these views has a utilitarian ﬂavor, and the second
has a prioritarian ﬂavor. However, it follows easily from Theorem 3
that of all the candidates, U is the only one which is always indifferent
between L= and LA, and that the W’s are the only candidates which always
regard L= as better than LA. I think that this is enough to establish that there
is at least one way of understanding distributive insensitivity, namely in
terms of the distribution of chances, which favors interpreting U as the
utilitarian betterness relation and the Ws as the prioritarian betterness
relations. But the analogy with the standard claim about distributive
sensitivity can be sharpened.
Consider a lottery in which hA will occur with chance p > 12 and hB
will occur with chance 1 − p. What I will call a Pigou-Dalton transfer of
chances transforms the lottery by reducing the chance of hA occurring to
q, so that p > q, and increases the chance of hB occurring to 1 − q subject
to the constraint that q > 1 − p. The constraint guarantees that the person
who was the better off of the two people affected by the transfer to start
with, A, is left better off than B originally was. One example of a Pigou-
Dalton transfer of chances is the transformation of LA into L=, another is
the transformation of LA into a lottery in which hA will occur with chance
3
4 and hB will occur with chance
1
4 . But now consider
Alternate claim about distributive insensitivity Utilitarianism is always
indifferent to Pigou-Dalton transfers of chances. By contrast, prioritarianism
always regards them as improvements.
The alternate claim exactly mimics the standard claim, except that it
is stated in terms of the distribution of chances rather than individual
goodness. But it is very easy to use Theorem 3 to show that of all the
candidates, U is the only one which is always indifferent to Pigou-Dalton
transfers of chances, and that the Ws are the only candidates which always
regard Pigou-Dalton transfers of chances as improvements. Therefore,
interpreting U as the utilitarian betterness relation and the Ws as the
class of prioritarian betterness relations is the only interpretation which
vindicates the alternate claim about distributive insensitivity. I ignore
the possibility of interpreting a proper subset of the Ws as the class of
prioritarian betterness relations. If the point of the interpretation is to
vindicate the alternate claim, this interpretation is gerrymandered and
should be ignored (Lewis 1983). But the standard claim about distributive
insensitivity does nothing to constrain the interpretation of the candidates.
Therefore, interpreting U as the utilitarian betterness relation and the Ws
as the class of prioritarian betterness relations vindicates the original and
somewhat vague platitude about distributive insensitivity better than any
other interpretation, and well enough.
Itmight be objected thatwhereas the standard claim about distributive
sensitivity is widely regarded as a platitude, the alternate claim is not. But
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it is commonly accepted that something can count as the referent of a
term without vindicating the platitudes that contain the term perfectly.
It is only required that as long as no single interpretation vindicates the
platitudes perfectly, the interpretationmakes the platitudes approximately
true, or makes some sentences that are similar enough to the platitudes
perfectly true, and does better than any competing interpretation. This
idea is often used in the metaphysics of David Lewis. It is often deployed
when there is strong pressure to make sense of a body of discourse and no
single interpretation results from no interpretation. But the problem with
using the standard claim about distributive insensitivity was not that no
interpretation vindicates it, but that toomany interpretations vindicate it. I
have already pointed out how much pressure there is to make sense of the
utilitarian and prioritarian presupposition, and I am adapting the idea to
the casewhere no single interpretation results fromno single interpretation.
Interpersonal and intrapersonal aggregation . Theorem 3 shows that the only
disagreement between U and the rest of the candidates is over whether
the betterness relation satisﬁes strong independence. U claims that it
does, and the rest of the candidates claim that it does not. Call an
individual i’s individual betterness relation the relation ‘at least as good
for i as’ which holds between lotteries over histories. Each individual
betterness relation is a special case of the better life lottery relation. But
we are taking it to be a background assumption that the better life lottery
relation satisﬁes the axioms of expected utility theory. It then follows that
each person’s individual betterness relation satisﬁes strong independence.
Therefore, U says there is a strong analogy between interpersonal and
intrapersonal aggregation: both the betterness relation and individual
betterness relations satisfy strong independence. And the rest of the
candidates say there is a strong disanalogy: the betterness relation does
not satisfy strong independence, but individual betterness relations do.
Therefore, interpreting U as the utilitarian betterness relation vindicates
the platitude that utilitarianism treats interpersonal and intrapersonal
aggregation in the same way.
Every candidate apart from U treats interpersonal and intrapersonal
aggregation differently. So the Ws are not alone in doing that. But
the literature has typically seen the alleged distributive insensitivity of
utilitarianism as closely connected with the way it treats interpersonal and
intrapersonal aggregation in the same way. So the literature sees the way
prioritarianismdeparts fromutilitarianism in its treatment of interpersonal
and intrapersonal aggregation as closely connected with the way it is not
distributively insensitive.
I have suggested that for ideas about distributive sensitivity to
constrain interpretation, distributive sensitivity has to be understood with
respect to the distribution of chances. But of all the candidates which reject
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the claim that the betterness relation satisﬁes strong independence, it is
precisely the Ws which do that by satisfying the lottery claim. But it was
satisfying the lottery claim that underwrote the claim of the Ws to be
distributively sensitive.
Therefore, interpreting the Ws as the prioritarian betterness relations
does a better job than any other interpretation at vindicating the platitude
that prioritarianism treats interpersonal and intrapersonal aggregation
differently, and in a way which is closely connected with its distributive
sensitivity. So interpreting U as the utilitarian betterness relation and the
Ws as the prioritarian betterness relations does a good job at vindicating
the various established views about the ways in which utilitarianism and
prioritarianism treat interpersonal and intrapersonal aggregation.
The separateness of persons. The sole dispute between U and the rest of
the candidates is over whether the betterness relation satisﬁes strong
independence. Now even among those who deny that the betterness
relation satisﬁes strong independence there is acknowledged to be a
burden of proof. For arguments in the style of Samuelson (1952) already
rehearsed are widely thought to establish a good prima facie case for
the betterness relation satisfying strong independence. Call a symmetrical
contest a case in which there are two possible histories of the form hA
and hB. As far as I can see, the only established view which accepts that
individual betterness relations satisfy strong independence but denies that
the betterness relation satisﬁes strong independence appeals to the view
that it is best to distribute the chances equally in symmetrical contests. And
in section 5 we saw that that view is typically backed up by appeals to the
separateness of persons, or the signiﬁcance of the personal point of view.
Therefore, interpreting U as the utilitarian betterness relation and the
Ws as the class of prioritarian betterness relations vindicates the platitude
about the separateness of persons as follows. Contrary to what is some-
times claimed, utilitarianism need not be seen as resting on a daft view
about persons. Rather, it rests on the view that the truth about persons –
the fact that they are separate, have their own personal points of view,
and so on – ought to be ignored because it is irrelevant. It just does not
cut any ice with the Samuelson-style argument for strong independence.
Prioritarianism, by contrast, rests on the view that such facts about persons
somehowdooverride the argument for strong independence and therefore
ought not to be ignored, as witnessed by the rationales that have been
offered for the view that it is best to distribute the chances equally in
symmetrical contests.
In summary, interpreting U as the utilitarian betterness relation and the
Ws as the prioritarian betterness relations vindicates what are taken to
be platitudes about utilitarianism and prioritarianism. It vindicates the
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 27 Nov 2012
UTILITARIANISM AND PRIORITARIANISM I 357
platitude about ethical signiﬁcance. It vindicates the way the topics of
distributive insensitivity, interpersonal and intrapersonal aggregation,
and the separateness of persons have been seen as interconnected. And
it also vindicates the way in which the rationales for utilitarianism
and prioritarianism have typically been seen as contrastive. For the
fundamental dispute is overwhether the betterness relation satisﬁes strong
independence. Utilitarianism, now understood as the claim that U is
the betterness relation, says it does. That is what makes utilitarianism
ignore the separateness of persons, treat interpersonal and intrapersonal
aggregation in the same way, and be distributively insensitive in the way
described. Prioritarianism, now understood as the claim that one of the
Ws is the betterness relation, says it does not. In particular, prioritarianism
says that the distribution of chances in symmetrical contests matters.
That is how prioritarianism expresses the view that the separateness of
persons is somehow important, and is what makes it treat interpersonal
and intrapersonal aggregation differently and be distributively sensitive
in the way described.
There are some more technical arguments for interpreting U as the
utilitarian betterness relation and the Ws as the prioritarian betterness
relations, but I will stop here as the case for that interpretation is already
very strong.
7. EX POST VIEWS
However, we need to remember that we have so far been looking at ex ante
interpretations of utilitarianism and prioritarianism. So what has actually
been argued is that U is the ex ante utilitarian betterness relation, and that
the Ws are the ex ante prioritarian betterness relations.
But what about ex post views? We could pursue this question by the
laborious method of doing for ex post views what we just did for ex ante
views. But a shortcut comes from noticing something special about U. U
is represented by the function
∑
iu(i, L). But the second property of u (i, L)
described in section 1 (i.e. the fact that u (i, L) is an expectational function)
means that we can write
∑
iu(i, L) in an expanded form. For any lottery of
the form L = [p1, h1; p2, h2; . . .; pm, hm],
∑
iu(i, L) equals
∑
i
∑
j p ju(i, h j )
where the is index the differentmembers of the population and the js index
the different possible histories and their corresponding probabilities. This
can be seen as expressing an ex ante approach to aggregation because the∑
jpju(j, hj) part of the expression gives us an evaluation of the lottery
from the point of view of individual i. The
∑
i part of the expression
then combines the evaluations from the points of view of all the different
individuals into an overall evaluation of the lottery. So U can be seen as
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dealing with uncertainty ﬁrst, then people, and hence as taking an ex ante
approach to aggregation.
However, it is just a matter of some elementary algebra to show that∑
iu(i, L) also equals
∑
j p j
∑
i u(i, h j )
But now, the
∑
iu(i, hj) part of the expression combines the evaluations of
the history hj from the points of view of all the different individuals into
an overall evaluation of hj. The
∑
jpj part of the expression then combines
the evaluations of all the different histories by taking into account the
probability of each history. So U can be seen as dealing with people
ﬁrst, then uncertainty, and hence as also taking an ex post approach to
aggregation.
But suppose that we can show that interpreting U as the ex post
utilitarian betterness relation vindicates the platitudes about utilitarianism
better than interpreting any other relation which takes an ex post approach
to aggregation as the ex post utilitarian betterness relation. Then the case
for interpreting U as the (now unqualiﬁed) utilitarian betterness relation
will be beyond doubt.
To argue for that supposition, itwill help to sharpenourunderstanding
of U. We have now seen all the ideas that go into expected utility
theory. For a binary relation between lotteries satisﬁes the expected utility
axioms just in case it is a continuous ordering which satisﬁes strong
independence. Theorem 4 below is a variation upon the original theorem
of Harsanyi (1955). The interpersonal addition theorem of Broome (1991)
departs fromHarsanyi’s theoremby replacing talk of individual preference
relations with individual betterness relations. Theorem 4 departs from the
interpersonal addition theoremby subsuming talk of individual betterness
relations under talk of the better life lottery relation, and by explicitly
assuming that the better life lottery relation is complete and that the
betterness relation is impartial. The rectangular ﬁeld assumption turns
out not to be needed (Coulhon and Mongin, 1989).
Theorem 4: Assume a constant population of individuals i = 1 . . . n.
Suppose that the better life lottery relation satisﬁes the axioms of expected
utility theory; the betterness relation satisﬁes the axioms of expected utility
theory and is impartial; and the principle of personal good is true. Then
there exists an expectational function u (i, L) which represents the better
life lottery relation such that
∑
iu(i, L) represents the betterness relation.
In other words, if the premises of the theorem are true, then U is the
betterness relation.
In order for a candidate betterness relation to be interpreted as the
(ex post) utilitarian betterness relation, it has to express plausible ethical
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ideas when interpreted as the betterness relation. That is because of
the platitude about ethical signiﬁcance. But ignoring the idealizing
assumptions about completeness, there are only really two assumptions
in the premises of Theorem 4 against which there is a reasonable ethical
case. Hence there are really only two ways of generating relations different
from U which are candidates to be interpreted as the (ex post) utilitarian
betterness relation.
The ﬁrst criticizable assumption, built into the second premise, is
the assumption that the betterness relation satisﬁes strong independence.
Because of Diamond’s example, denying this assumption is certainly
possible. But using Diamond’s example in this way is not consistent with
ex post approaches, for given that the betterness relation is impartial, they
will regard the two histories hA and hB as equally good and hence will not
distinguish between them when they come to factor in uncertainty.
The second criticizable assumption is the principle of personal good.
As far as I can see, this is the only place in the premises of Theorem 4
where there is room for a principled ex post challenge. This example is due
to Broome (1991).
L= 12
1
2
A 1 0
B 0 1
LE 12
1
2
A 1 0
B 1 0
L= is exactly as good as LE for A. And L= is exactly as good as LE for B. So
the principle of personal good entails that L= and LE are equally good. But
there is an egalitarian case for the claim that LE is better than L=. For in LE
there is guaranteed equality of outcome, whereas in L= there is guaranteed
inequality of outcome. Moreover, this challenge takes an ex post approach
to aggregation. Any ex ante approach is going to say that L= and LE are
equally good because they are equally good for each person.
We can now claim that of all the ex post candidate betterness relations,
interpreting U as the ex post utilitarian betterness relation is the best way
of vindicating the platitudes about utilitarianism. This is for three reasons.
First, there is certainly a good prima facie case for taking the principle
of personal good to be part of utilitarian doctrine. Offhand it would be
astonishing for a utilitarian to deny that, for example, if two lotteries
are equally good for each person then they are equally good. However,
we have seen that denying the principle of personal good is the only
reasonably plausible and distinctively ex post challenge to the premises of
Theorem 4. But it is easily seen to be a logical truth that, given all of the
premises of Theorem 4 apart from the principle of personal good, U is the
only candidate betterness relation which is consistent with the principle
of personal good. Therefore, all the reasonably plausible and distinctively
ex post challenges to U involve denying the principle of personal good.
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Hence of all the candidate betterness relations which take an ex post
approach, it is only U which when interpreted as the ex post utilitarian
betterness relation is consistent with what looks like a central part of
utilitarian doctrine. This creates a strong presumption for interpreting U
as the ex post utilitarian betterness relation.
Second, I take it to be a platitude that the main way utilitarianism
departs from egalitarianism is in having no non-instrumental concernwith
equality. But any non-instrumental concern with equality is almost bound
to see LE as better than L= and reject the principle of personal good. So in
accepting the principle of personal good U can be seen as expressing no
non-instrumental concern with equality. Therefore, interpreting U as the
ex post utilitarian betterness relation vindicates the main platitude about
how utilitarianism is opposed to egalitarianism.
Third, we have already seen the platitude that utilitarianism is distri-
butively insensitive. But interpreting U as the ex post utilitarian betterness
relation provides a new way of vindicating this platitude. For as its
indifference between L= and LE illustrates, when two histories are equally
likely, U is indifferent to the way the goods of each individual are
distributed across the two histories.
For the purposes of the present argument, I take the second and
third points to be added bonuses of interpreting U as the ex post
utilitarian betterness relation. The ﬁrst point is the strongest reason
for that interpretation. But together, these make a very strong case for
interpreting U as the ex post utilitarian betterness relation. And that means
the evidence for the claim thatU is simply the utilitarian betterness relation
is overwhelming.
8. CONCLUSION
But now we can discharge the two main tasks of this article. First, if
the relation represented by
∑
iu(i, L) is the utilitarian betterness relation,
it follows by an inference to individual goodness that the individual
goodness measures are a subset of the positive afﬁne transformations of
u (i, L). The utilitarian and prioritarian presupposition is vindicated. In
addition, u (i, L) is an expectational function. A basic result from expected
utility theory tells us that the positive afﬁne transformations of u (i, L) are
precisely the expectational functions which represent the better life lottery
relation. So we have a defense of a claim which is often made without a
shred of justiﬁcation, namely that individual goodness is expectational.
Second, I have already argued that the Ws are the ex ante prioritarian
betterness relations. But now the evidence for the claim that U is the
utilitarian betterness relation is stronger, so is the claim that the Ws are
the ex ante prioritarian betterness relations. For given that the individual
goodness measures are a subset of the positive afﬁne transformations of
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u (i, L), it follows directly from the deﬁnition of ex ante prioritarianism we
began with that the Ws are the ex ante prioritarian betterness relations.
And we now have an answer to Broome’s (1991) claim that priorita-
rianism is more or less meaningless. Broome claims that prioritarianism
distinguishes between individual goodness and how much individual
goodness contributes towards overall goodness. But he argues that is a
meaningless distinction. My account of ex ante prioritarianism nowhere
takes such a distinction for granted, so does not make the claim Broome
criticizes. But if a further answer is needed, it is this. Utilitarianism tells
us to maximize the sum of individual goodness. Ex ante prioritarianism
tells us to maximize the sum of some strictly concave transformation of
individual goodness. And if an intuitive meaning means to be supplied to
the transformation, it is straightforward.
Very roughly, the additionof a concave transformation to theutilitarian
formula reﬂects the view that the betterness relation satisﬁes the lottery
claim, so that the distribution of chances matters, at least in symmetrical
contests. But if the distribution of chances matters in symmetrical contests,
it is very plausible that it matters in at least some contests which are
not entirely symmetrical. And different concave transformations express
different opinions about the distribution of chances in such cases. For
example, suppose that two contestants A and B to a single indivisible
good are equally well off to start with, but that A would beneﬁt more from
getting the good than B. Without going into details, one can show that one
version of ex ante prioritarianism (where the concave transformation is the
square root function) recommends givingA and B chances in proportion to
how much they would beneﬁt from the good. Another version (where the
concave transformation is the logarithmic function) recommends giving
A and B equal chances. Ex post prioritarianism raises somewhat different
issues which I hope to discuss elsewhere.
The use of representation theorems in general, andHarsanyi’s theorem
in particular, to ﬁgure out what utilitarianism is has a bad reputation,
mainly because of inﬂuential remarks due to Sen (1976, 1977, 1986) and
elaboration byWeymark (1991). But I think Sen should have no complaints
about the approach taken here. In my terminology, not his, Sen claims
that prior to substantive argument, it is an open question whether any
particular function which represents the better life lottery relation, such
as u (i, L), is an individual goodness measure. And he claims that given
an account of what the individual goodness measures are, it is a further
question whether utilitarianism is correct.
Agreed. But this does not show that representation theorems,
Harsanyi’s in particular, do not play a crucial role in ﬁguring out what the
individual goodness measures are. We can use representation theorems,
including Harsanyi’s, to ﬁgure out which relations are the utilitarian
and prioritarian betterness relations, and hence which functions are
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the individual goodness measures. I have claimed that this approach
shows that the individual goodness measures lie among the positive
afﬁne transformations of u (i, L). But this is the conclusion of substantive
argument; it is not the kind of arbitrary deﬁnition Sen was complaining
about. And it does not follow that utilitarianism is correct. For one can
accept everything said here while still regarding the truth of the premises
of Harsanyi’s theorem, and hence the truth of utilitarianism, as a further
question.
Finally, I have not said whether the individual goodness measures
are all of the positive afﬁne transformations of u (i, L), or whether they
form some strict subset of those functions. So for example, I have not said
whether individual goodness measures are unique up to positive afﬁne
transformation, or whether they satisfy some tighter condition, such as
being unique up to positive linear transformation. The most obvious way
of pursuing this would be to extend the approach taken here to ﬁgure
out what the utilitarian betterness relation is when the population size is
allowed to vary. It is arguable that this forces the set of individual goodness
measures to be unique up to positive linear transformation; see McCarthy
(forthcoming) for a sketch of this argument.
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